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Abstract 
Our body is central to our sense of self and personal identity, yet can be manipulated in 
the lab surprisingly easy ways. Several multisensory illusions have shown the flexibility 
of the mental representation of our bodies by inducing the illusion of owning an 
artificial body part or having a body part with altered features. Recently, new studies 
showed we can embody additional body parts, such as a supernumerary finger. 
Newport and colleagues (2016) recently reported a novel six-finger illusion using 
conflicting visual and tactile signals induced with the mirror box to create the illusory 
perception of having a sixth finger for a brief moment. In the present study, we aimed to 
replicate this result and to investigate whether the experience of embodiment of a sixth 
finger could be prolonged for an extended duration by applying continuous visual-
tactile stimulation. Results showed that a continuous illusion of having a sixth-finger 
can be clearly induced. This shows that the six-finger illusion does not reflect merely a 
momentary confusion due to conflicting multi-sensory signals, but can reflect an 
enduring representation of a supernumerary finger.  
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Our body is at the core of our sense of self and our identity as a person. It is a 
ubiquitous presence in our perceptual experience, in de Vignemont’s words, "the 
fundamental core of bodily awareness is relatively permanent (…) because normally 
does not change" (de Vignemont, 2018, p. 11). Despite this, research over the past two 
decades has demonstrated remarkable flexibility of bodily experience, which can be 
altered using a range of surprisingly simple multisensory illusions and using virtual 
reality (VR) (Longo & Haggard, 2012). For example, in the rubber hand illusion, 
participants report experiencing a sense of body ownership over a prosthetic hand they 
see touched in synchrony with their actual hand (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Longo, 
Schüür, Kammers, Tsakiris, & Haggard,  2008). Analogous illusions produce ownership 
over faces (Sforza et al., 2010; Tajadura-Jiménez et al., 2012; Tsakiris, 2008), feet (Crea 
et al., 2015; Lenggenhager et al., 2015), mouths (Bono & Haggard, 2019), and full bodies 
(Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Petkova & Ehrsson, 2008; Slater, 2009). A range of other 
illusions have shown that various features of body representation can be manipulated, 
including the experienced size of body parts (Gandevia & Phegan, 1999; Kilteni et al., 
2012; Lackner, 1988; Normand et al., 2011), body weight (Piryankova et al., 2014; 
Preston & Ehrsson, 2016), age (Banakou et al., 2013), ethnicity (Maister et al., 2013; 
Peck et al., 2013), visibility (D’Angelo et al., 2017, in press; Guterstam et al., 2013), and 
solidity (Senna et al., 2014). Such results show that despite the basic stability of our 
bodily features and our lifetime of experience with our body, our bodily experiences can 
be plastically altered by the features of our immediate sensory experience. 
The previous examples involve situations in which the features or identity of our 
body or its parts are altered, but preserve the qualitative configuration of the human 
body. A number of recent studies, however, have gone further and shown that we can 
also experience extra body parts, which do not exist at all in reality. While the 
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experience of such supernumerary body parts had been described in neurological 
conditions (Halligan et al., 1993; Hari et al., 1998; McGonigle et al., 2002), the finding 
that they can be induced in healthy participants using simple multisensory 
manipulations is striking. One set of studies have created the experience of having a 
supernumerary third arm (Ehrsson, 2009; Newport et al., 2010; Won et al., 2015). Other 
research has shown that participants in VR can embody an avatar with a tail, and use 
the tail effectively to control actions (Steptoe et al., 2013). Finally, two recent studies 
have created the experience of having a sixth finger on one’s hand (Hoyet et al., 2016; 
Newport et al., 2016). Hoyet and colleagues used VR to induce the embodiment of an 
avatar hand with six fingers, by adding visuomotor control and feedback of the 
animated virtual hand and to each of the six fingers. Although they did not give 
instructions to control the sixth finger, participants intuitively applied strategies such as 
moving the ring finger to control the additional finger, feeling ownership over the sixth 
finger and over the whole six-fingered hand.  
Newport and colleagues (2016) used the mirror box illusion (Ramachandran & 
Rogers-Ramachandran, 1996) to induce a somewhat similar experience of having a 
sixth finger, what they called the Anne Boleyn illusion. The mirror box was created in an 
attempt to treat patients with intractable phantom limb pain, particularly patients who 
felt their lost limb was clenched, with the fingernails digging into the skin 
(Ramachandran & Rogers-Ramachandran, 1996); watching the contralateral spared 
limb reflected in the mirror created the illusion of watching the lost limb and therefore, 
to watch it unclench, which was meant to alleviate the pain. The mirror box is often 
used to explore multisensory integration by manipulating visual, tactile, and 
proprioceptive information about the hands (e.g., Cardini & Longo, 2016; Holmes et al., 
2004; Liu & Medina, 2018; Sadibolova & Longo, 2014; Romano et al., 2013). A typical 
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mirror box setup is shown in Figure 1. The participant places their two hands on 
opposite sides of a mirror aligned with their body midline so that one hand is occluded 
while the other hand is reflected in the mirror such that it appears to be a direct view of 
the occluded contralateral hand. This effect allows for the dissociation of the visual 
information from other sensorimotor inputs, such as touch, and can create inconsistent 
visual and tactile signals (Cardini & Longo, 2016; Longo et al., 2012).  
Using the mirror box, Newport and colleagues (2016) induced the perception of 
having a sixth finger by stroking the empty space near the little finger on the seen hand 
while the unseen hand was synchronously stroked on the little finger. The experimenter 
stroked the top of the five fingers of the seen hand, reflected in the mirror, followed by a 
stroke on an empty space next to the little finger (see the second panel of Figure 1 for a 
schematic of this logic). At the same time, the experimenter stroked the four fingers of 
the hidden hand, followed by a stroke on the lateral inner side of the little finger, 
suggesting both little fingers were stroked. So, when the last stroke was performed on 
the outer side of the hidden hand little finger, while the sixth finger on the seen hand is 
stroked, the touch is mapped to the sixth finger. This technique created a brief and 
fleeting experience of the supernumerary finger.  
In the present study we aimed to replicate the results of Newport and colleagues 
and to investigate whether by using a different pattern of stimulation a continuous and 
longer-lasting experience of having a sixth finger could be induced. Experiment 1 was a 
direct replication of the paradigm of Newport and colleagues. In Experiment 2, we 
employed a new technique using twenty back-and-forth strokes to try to induce a 
continuous experience of the sixth finger. In both experiments, we added a follow-up 
procedure to the questionnaire to determine whether experiences were felt for a brief 
moment or for an extended period. 





Twenty people (M ± SD = 30 ± 2.6 years; 15 females) participated after giving 
written informed consent. No exclusion criteria were applied. The study was performed 
in accordance to the Declaration of Helsinki and approved by the Department of 
Psychological Sciences Ethics Committee at Birkbeck. All participants were right-
handed, as assessed by the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971), M = 90.3, 
range from 52.3 to 100.  
The effects reported by Newport and colleagues (2016) were very strong. In 
their laboratory-based study, the smallest t-statistic comparing the illusion and control 
conditions in the key illusion questions was 17.5, which corresponds to an effect size of 
Cohen’s dz = 4.125. A power analysis using G*Power 3.1 (Faul et al., 2007) with a 2-
tailed alpha of 0.05 and power of 0.95 indicated that 4 participants were required. Thus, 
our sample size of 20 should be well powered to replicate the illusion and to probe the 
duration that it lasts. Even if an effect of duration were substantially smaller than the 
overall illusion, we would still have reasonable power. For example, we would have 
greater than 0.8 power to detect an effect of Cohen's dz = 0.7. 
 
Procedure 
We used a standard mirror box setup, similar to that used by Newport and 
colleagues (2016), and to other studies using this illusion to manipulate bodily 
experience. The participant sat at a table with a mirror (30 cm high, 40 cm wide) 
positioned on the table aligned with their body midline. They placed their left hand 
behind the mirror and their right hand in front of it. When they looked into the mirror, 
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the reflection of their right hand thus appeared to be a direct view of their occluded left 
hand, as shown in Figure 1. Both hands were positioned at 24 cm from the border of the 
table and 20 cm from the mirror, marked by two yellow dots where they were asked to 
place the tip of each index finger. The participant was asked to look into the mirror at 
the hand throughout each trial. The left hand was hidden behind the mirror and the 
right hand is hereafter referred as the seen hand, although it is important to note that 
the right hand was not seen directly, but only its reflection in the mirror, which is 




Figure 1: The experimental setup. The participant watched the reflection of their right hand on the 
mirror while their left hand was occluded behind the mirror. When the experimenter stroked the right 
hand, the participant saw that hand being stroked through the reflection on the mirror, resembling the 
left hand due to the mirror optical reverse effect. Each finger was stroked once, on the top of the finger of 
both hands synchronously, from the knuckle to the tip, starting on the thumb to the ring finger. The 
occluded little finger was then stroked on the inside lateral at the same time as the top of the little finger 
on the seen hand, followed by a stroke on the outer lateral of the occluded little finger synchronously to 
touching the empty space next to the seen little finger. In Experiment 2 the sequence is similar, but each 
stroke was replaced by a double back and forth stroke and the last step is performed twenty times 
instead of once, to assess the duration of the illusion. The control condition followed the same procedure 
up to the little finger, stroking the seen little finger once again instead of the sixth finger on the last stroke. 
By doing the 6th stroke on the little finger, the touch should be mapped onto the little finger, therefore no 
illusion should occur. The stroking sequence is numbered in the figure.   
 
Following Newport and colleagues (2016), the logic of the six-finger illusion in 
Experiment 1 is shown in Figure 1 (second panel). Each finger was stroked once in 
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sequence from the thumb to the ring finger, on the top of the finger of both hands 
synchronously, from the knuckle to the tip. The little finger of the occluded left hand 
was then stroked on the inside lateral surface at the same time as the top surface of the 
little finger on the seen right hand. This was followed by a stroke on the outer lateral 
surface of the occluded little finger at the same time as a movement of the 
experimenter’s finger in the empty space next to the seen little finger. 
In a control condition, each finger was stroked similarly to the illusion condition 
from the thumb to the little finger and the last stroke on the seen hand was applied on 
the little finger instead of the sixth finger localisation, at the same time as the outer side 
of the hidden little finger. The sixth stroke in the control condition was identical to the 
5th, preventing the illusion of a sixth finger.  
In Experiment 2, the procedure was similar except that each finger was stroked 
four times back and forth simultaneously on each hand from the thumb to the ring 
finger. The occluded little finger was then stroked on the inner lateral surface at the 
same time as the top of little finger on the seen hand, followed by a stroke on the outer 
lateral of the occluded little finger synchronously to touching the empty space next to 
the seen little finger. The last stroke was conducted twenty times.  
The same 5-item questionnaire used by Newport and colleagues (2016) was 
applied to assess the subjective experience of the illusion (see Figure 2 for the specific 
items). The order of the items was the same for all conditions and participants. 
Participants rated their agreement or disagreement with each item using a 7-point 
Likert scale from -3 ("strongly disagree") to 3 ("strongly agree"). In addition, and unlike 
Newport and colleagues, when participants returned a positive answer to a specific 
question (i.e., a score greater than 0), we followed-up by asking a further for agreement 
with two sub-questions probing whether the experience was felt “for a brief moment” 
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or “for an extended period of time”. For example, if a participant gave a rating of 1 to the 
statement “It felt like I had six fingers on my left hand”, we then asked them to rate their 
agreement using the same scale to the items “It felt like I had six fingers on my left hand 
for a brief moment” and “It felt like I had six fingers on my left hand for an extended 
period of time”. 
 
Analysis 
 For each questionnaire item in each experiment, we used paired t-tests to 
compare agreement in the illusion and control conditions. As participants rarely agreed 
with any of the questionnaire items in the control condition, analysis of the data for the 
follow-up questions was conducted comparing means in the illusion condition to 0 
using one-sample t-tests. In order to ensure we had a reasonable amount of data, 
follow-up questions were only analysed for items for which at least half of the 
participants indicated agreement (i.e., a rating greater than 0) in at least one of the 
experimental blocks. In each case, we applied Holm-Bonferroni multiple-comparison 
correction to control for the fact that we conducted similar tests on multiple items. 
 We also compared responses between the two experiments. For overall 
agreement with each of the 5 questionnaire items, we conducted a 2x2 repeated-
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with factors condition (illusion, control) and 
duration (single stroke, 20 strokes). For the follow-up questions, the situation is more 
complicated because not every participant produced data for each item in each 
experiment. We therefore conducted linear mixed-effects modelling (Baayen, Davidson, 
& Bates, 2008) using the lme4 toolbox for R (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) as 
such models do not require that data for each condition be present for each participant. 
For each of the three questionnaire items that at least half of the participants showed 
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agreement with in at least one block in each experiment, we conducted separate mixed-
effects models on the two follow-up questions (i.e., “brief moment” and “extended 
period”), modelling duration and participants as random-effects and including by-
participant random intercepts and slopes. The significance of the effect of duration was 
assessed using model comparison (Barr et al., 2013). 
 
Results 
Experiment 1 – Single Stroke 
Agreement with the questionnaire items in Experiment 1 is shown in the top left 
panel of Figure 2. Overall, there were clear differences between the illusion and control 
conditions in terms of the feeling of having six fingers, t(19) = 5.84, p < 0.0001, dz = 1.30, 
having two little fingers, t(19) = 4.28, p < 0.001, dz = 0.96, feeling touch where it is not 
normally felt, t(19) = 3.47, p < 0.005, dz = 0.78, and feeling a touch off the body, t(19) = 
2.61, p < 0.02, dz = 0.58. In contrast, there was no difference between conditions in 
terms of feeling like there was an extra hand, t(19) = 0.86, p = 0.40, dz = 0.19. This 
pattern of results is very similar to that reported by Newport et al. (2016), although 
absolute levels of agreement in the illusion condition were somewhat lower in our 
study. 
Unlike Newport et al. (2016), when participants indicated agreement with one of 
these items, we also obtained follow-up ratings of whether each of these experiences 
was felt “for a brief moment” or “for an extended period of time”. Because agreement 
was infrequent to any of the items in the control condition, we focused our analysis on 
the illusion condition, comparing mean agreement with each of the follow-up items to 0. 
As described above, we only analysed items for which at least half of the participants 
indicated agreement on at least one of the experimental blocks. Three of the items met 
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this criterion, as shown in the top right panel of Figure 2. In each case, participants 
clearly agreed that each experience was felt for a brief moment, for feeling like there 
were six fingers on the left hand, t(11) = 7.88, p < 0.0001, d = 2.28, that there were two 
little fingers, t(11) = 8.48, p < 0.0001, d = 2.45, and that they felt a touch where they do 
not normally feel it, t(11) = 9.53, p < 0.0001, d = 2.75. For each of these items, there was 
also significant disagreement that they occurred for an extended period of time, t(11) = 
-2.67, -6.28, and -5.68, all p’s < 0.05, d = 0.77, 1.81, and 1.64, respectively. These results 
clearly show that the experience of the sixth finger lasted for only a fleeting moment.  
 
Experiment 2 – Extended Stroking 
 Agreement with the questionnaire items in Experiment 2 is shown in the bottom 
left panel of Figure 2. As in Experiment 1, there were clear differences between the 
illusion and control conditions in terms of the feeling of having six fingers, t(19) = 7.86, 
p < 0.0001, dz = 1.76, having two little fingers, t(19) = -5.49, p < 0.0001, dz = 1.23, feeling 
touch where it is not normally felt, t(19) = 4.14, p < 0.001, dz = 0.93, and feeling a touch 
off the body, t(19) = 6.32, p < 0.0001, dz = 1.41. Unlike in Experiment 1, there was also a 
significant difference between conditions in the feeling of having an extra hand, t(19) = 
2.93, p < 0.01, dz = 0.66, although absolute agreement with this item in the illusion 
condition was substantially lower than all the other items.  
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Figure 2: Mean scores for the reported experience of embodying a non-body part, using a 7-point Likert 
scale. Illusion and control conditions were counterbalanced, and the results averaged between the two 
trials of each condition. In Experiment 1, a single stroke technique was applied, similar to the Newport 
study, whereas in Experiment 2 we applied a double back and forth stroke, with a final step of 20 strokes 
on the sixth finger. Overall, the illusion of having a sixth finger was successfully induced in Experiments 1 
and 2, significantly different from the control condition. There were higher scores in Experiment 2, with a 
main effect of illusion and experiment in inducing the illusion. When participants answered positively to 
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experiencing having a sixth finger or a touch outside of the body, a second question followed to assess if 
the illusion was felt for only a moment or for a long duration; these results are presented in the right side 
of the panel. Generally, participants felt a sixth finger for only a moment in experiment 1 and felt the 
illusion for a long duration in experiment 2. 
 
Four of the items were agreed with by at least half the participants in at least one 
illusion block, as shown in the bottom right panel of Figure 2. In striking contrast to 
Experiment 1, participants now agreed that the experiences occurred for an extended 
period of time, for having six fingers, t(18) = 5.02, p < 0.0001, d = 1.15, having two little 
fingers, t(17) = 5.41, p < 0.0001, d = 1.28, feeling touch where it is not normally felt, 
t(13) = 2.57, p < 0.05, d = 0.69, and feeling a touch off the body, t(13) = 4.20, p < 0.001, d 
= 1.12. Again in contrast to Experiment 1, there was neither significant agreement nor 
disagreement about these experiences occurring for only a brief moment for any item, 
t(18, 17, 13, 13) = 0.79, 0.76, 0.72, and 1.29, d = 0.18, 0.18, 0.19, and 0.35, respectively. 
These results indicate that unlike in Experiment 1, the experience of the six-finger 
illusion lasted continuously for extended periods of time.  
 
Between-Experiment Comparisons  
To assess the effects of the amount of stroking, we conducted further analyses 
comparing the results from the two experiments. The 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA 
showed there was a significant effect of condition and experiment in embodying a sixth 
finger, in all questions except for feeling an extra hand. There was a significant 
interaction between condition and experiment for questionnaire items 1 and 4. Overall, 
condition significantly influenced the embodiment of a sixth finger, as shown in Table 1. 
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The embodiment of the sixth finger was also significantly influenced by experiment, 
denoting the effect of the type of procedure in inducing the illusion.  
Table 1 Main effects of condition and experiment in inducing the six-finger illusion (2x2 Repeated Measures ANOVA)  
            
  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
 DF F p F p F p F p F p 
Condition 1, 19 60.38 < .0001 55.55 .0001 21.00 .0002 36.71 < .0001 6.06 .02 
Experiment 1, 19 31.58 < .0001 5.26 .03 18.31 .0004 90.73 < .0001 0.33 .57 
Condition*Experiment 1, 19 7.17 .015 1.52 .23 0.57 .46 10.95 .004 2.03 .17 
            
Q1: It felt like I had six fingers on my left hand | Q2: It felt like I had two little fingers on my left hand | Q3: I felt a touch where I do not normally feel a 
touch | Q4: I felt a touch that was not on my body | Q5: It felt like I had an extra hand 
            
 
 To analyse the follow-up questionnaire items assessing duration, we used linear 
mixed-effects models with random slopes and random intercepts to assess if there was 
a significant difference between two experiments in terms of the duration the illusion 
was experienced. For each of the three questionnaire items we analysed, participants 
agreed more that the experience lasted “for a brief moment” in Experiment 1 and that 
the experience lasted “for an extended period” in Experiment 2. 
For the item “It felt like I had six fingers on my left hand” participants showed 
more agreement that the experience lasted “for a brief moment” in Experiment 1 (M =  
2.00, SE = 0.25) than Experiment 2 (M = 0.32, SE = 0.40), 2(1) = 35.36, p < 0.001, but 
more agreement that the experience lasted “for an extended period” in Experiment 2 (M 
= 1.71, SE = 0.34) than for Experiment 1 (M = -1.17, SE = 0.44), 2(1) = 59.65, p < 0.001.  
For the questionnaire item “It felt like I had two little fingers on my left hand”, 
participants showed more agreement that the experience lasted “for a brief moment” in  
Experiment 1 (M = 1.83, SE = 0.22) than in Experiment 2 (M = 0.33, SE = 0.44), 2(1) = 
51.55, p < 0.001, but more agreement that the experience lasted “for an extended 
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period” in Experiment 2 (M = 1.89, SE = 0.35) than in Experiment 1 (M = -1.75, SE = 
0.28), 2(1) = 79.64, p < 0.001.  
For the questionnaire item “I felt a touch where I do not normally feel a touch”  
participants showed more agreement that the experience lasted “for a brief moment” in 
Experiment 1 (M = 2.13, SE = 0.22) than Experiment 2 (M = 0.32, SE = 0.44), 2(1) = 
45.80, p < 0.001, but more agreement that the experience lasted “for an extended 
period” in Experiment 2 (M = 1.18, SE = 0.46) than Experiment 1 (M = -1.54, SE = 0.27), 
2(1, 26) = 62.09, p < 0.001. 
 
Discussion 
These results replicate the six-finger illusion reported recently by Newport and 
colleagues (2016).  The manipulation of the visual and tactile cues produced the illusion 
of having a six finger on one's hand, with significantly different scores obtained for the 
illusion compared to the control condition. Participants felt the illusion for only a brief 
moment in experiment 1 and felt the sixth finger for a long duration in experiment 2. 
The twenty back and forth strokes applied in Experiment 2, which can last between 27 
and 30 seconds, allowed the illusion of having a sixth finger to be maintained 
throughout the strokes, only fading once the experimenter stopped stroking the fingers. 
The illusion endures due to the continuity of the multisensory stimulation, it does not 
necessarily entail a lasting change in the mental representation of our hand beyond the 
stimulus, although such event was not investigated in this study. It may be that the 
changes in the mental representation of the hand linger beyond the stimulus, similarly 
to the findings in other studies using multisensory illusions (Newport et al., 2010; 
Normand et al., 2011), where temporary changes of the body representation were 
identified after the trials. The embodiment of a sixth finger is dependent on bottom-up 
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inputs, showing the flexibility of the embodiment experience of a supernumerary finger 
relies on the online sensorial inputs and their integration into a cohesive perception of 
our bodies.  These results show that by prolonging stroking, the experience of having a 
sixth finger can be experienced continuously. Interestingly, not only was the illusion not 
dissipated throughout the twenty back and forth strokes, it also produced a significantly 
stronger illusion overall. These results demonstrate that the illusion of having a sixth 
finger is not due merely to a fleeting moment of confusion, but can reflect an enduring 
experience of altered embodiment.  
To continuously feel a sixth finger on one's hand is a good example of the 
flexibility of mental body representations.  By tricking the mind into an illusory and 
vivid perception of having a non-body part, we can better understand the underlying 
mechanisms of multisensory integration, excluding models that imply a rigid mapping 
for the localisation of a touch in the body. Hence, the best fitting model for the 
localisation of a touch on a body part is a two-stage process (Longo et al., 2010)  in 
which a touch is first mapped relatively to other locations in the primary 
somatosensory cortex or subcortically, disentangled from a body reference at this stage.  
Second, it is mapped to a body location representation in the cortex, the 
superficial schema.  Touch applied to individual fingers or toes are often judged as 
having occurred on a different digit (Manser-Smith et al., 2018), with characteristic 
patterns of mislocalisations between digits (Braun et al., 2005; Manser-Smith et al., 
2018; Schweizer et al., 2000). Indeed, recent work shows analogous mislocalisations 
even between hands and feet (Badde et al., 2019). Such mislocalisations may explain 
how a touch on a finger can be perceptually misplaced onto the supernumerary sixth 
finger in the present illusion. Tactile localisation may rely on coding of location as a 
discrete feature rather than as a continuous location within a somatotopic map (Azañón 
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& Longo, 2019), in which case touch could be transferred illusorily to a representation 
of a novel supernumerary digit, analogous to illusory conjunction of features in vision 
(Treisman, 1996). A touch on a limb can be misattributed onto a different limb type, 
such as a touch on the hand can be perceived as had occurred in the foot, or to the other 
body side, only if the limb was placed at the typical side of that limb, by crossing the 
arms or legs (Badde et al., 2019). If the typical side of a limb plays such a relevant role in 
localising a touch on a limb when a categorical localisation system is in use, it helps 
explain the illusion of having a sixth finger on the left hand by watching an invisible 
sixth finger being stroked on what seems to be the left hand while the actual left hand is 
being touched on the little finger. If the sixth stroke is coded as a discrete feature 
instead of a precise external representation (Azañón & Longo, 2019), in that case, the 
sixth stroke can be instantly mapped onto a sixth finger, even without the previous five 
strokes.   
The trick of touching on the inner side of the little finger of the unseen hand at 
the same time as the top of the little finger of the reflected hand may be irrelevant, along 
with all the five strokes altogether. This will distance our interpretation of the sixth 
finger illusion from the idea that it is the relative mapping of the touch on the fingers 
that is assigning the final touch onto a supernumerary finger. If a discrete categorical 
system for the localisation of touch is supporting the illusion of having a sixth finger, it 
would be interesting to investigate if the illusion would be disrupted when a system of 
continuous localisation in external space is elicited. A task that requires a more precise 
continuous touch localisation might elicit this system, as opposed to just reporting a 
touch (Azañón & Longo, 2019; Badde et al., 2019). 
The replication of the Anne Boleyn illusion (Experiment 1) produced results 
similar to, but quantitatively weaker than those found by Newport and colleagues. We 
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attribute this to differences across participants in interpreting the experience of having 
a sixth finger; which could also be modulated by procedural differences: Newport and 
colleagues ran each trial twice and preceded the experiment with five matched touches, 
which may have helped participants detecting the sixth stroke.  
Knowing at a conceptual level that we do not have a sixth finger does not 
interfere with having sensations from the localisation where a sixth finger would be. 
This aspect is in line with studies that distinguish feeling the rubber hand is part of their 
body and believing it actually is. In a recent study, Tamè and colleagues (2018) 
investigated this dissociation in proprioceptive drift in the rubber hand illusion by 
giving different instructions for the subjective measures, distinguishing between feeling 
and believing the illusion.  Results showed that while participants did feel the illusion of 
being touched on the rubber hand or felt that the rubber hand was their own hand, they 
did not believe that was the case. This distinction is important by implying that the 
perceptual and cognitive processing arise from two different processes in 
proprioceptive drift. This is not always the case, since the influence of instruction was 
absent in other distorted body representations, which means there was no difference 
between asking about feeling or believing a particular body illusion (Tamè et al., 2017).  
The present results add to a growing literature showing that people are able to 
incorporate additional body parts into their mental representations of their body. The 
six-finger illusion (Newport et al., 2016) showed we easily feel and embody a sixth 
finger by manipulating visuo-tactile inputs using only a mirror. This illusion can also be 
reproduced next to the index finger as well, with no substantial differences (Newport et 
al., 2016), and it seems in informal testing in the lab to work as well on any finger 
location or position, such as on the top of the middle finger.  
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Our results contribute to a growing literature showing that people can be easily 
induced to experience rich embodiment over bodies strikingly different from their own. 
Recent studies suggest the mental representation of our bodies can be even more 
flexible than allowing for modified body parts, it also allows us to experience having 
novel body parts, such as owning a virtual tail (Steptoe et al., 2013), achieved or 
enhanced by using the first-person perspective, visuomotor synchrony and sensory 
feedback in VR (Won et al., 2015).  
Intriguingly, while more humans have five fingers on each hand, there are 
several documented cases of families with members having six fingers on their hands, 
(eg. Carlisle, 1813; Richieri-Costa et al., 1990). Often, however, the supernumerary 
finger is removed at birth since they are judged as a troublesome anomaly (McCarroll, 
2000),  and the neuromechanics and functionality of polydactyly hands, a congenital 
physical anomaly of hands with more than five fingers, had not been investigated until 
very recently. Mehring and colleagues (2019) investigated two polydactyl individuals 
with six-fingered hands. Remarkably, these individuals were able to use this 
supernumerary finger in highly-skilled ways, allowing them to perform types of actions 
impossible for five-fingered individuals. Measurement of somatotopic maps in 
somatosensory cortex showed that these people had a distinct representation of the 
extra finger. These results demonstrate that the human brain is perfectly capable of 
integrating non-standard body parts into mental body representations and using them 
to control the body part effectively. The individuals studied by Mehring and colleagues, 
however, have had a lifetime of experience with their sixth finger, and their nervous 
system had developed in its presence. Our results show that even without a lifetime of 
such experience, five-fingered participants can be easily induced to experience an 
enduring sixth-finger on their hand. 
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Family members with supernumerary limbs that have greater manipulation 
ability are a compelling case in the use of additional body parts, showing that the 
nervous system can develop to integrate an additional finger well-coordinated with the 
other fingers, without mobility or control deficits, becoming a useful asset (Mehring et 
al., 2019). More striking, however, is the flexibility of the body mental representation 
over immediate time-scales, without requiring a developing and adapting process over 
time. Healthy adult participants can feel that a six finger is part of their body in a few 
moments, by looking at their reflected hand on a mirror, being touched in a certain 
sequence (Newport et al., 2016). Here, we showed that this illusion of embodying a sixth 
finger can be maintained over an extended period of time, suggesting that our self-
representation is prepared to incorporate additional body parts. Studies in VR show 
that we perform better with extra virtual body parts (Kilteni et al., 2012; Steptoe et al., 
2013; Won et al., 2015), and choose to use novel body parts if they are of benefit to the 
task, learning in a fast pace to control more degrees of freedom. 
Our procedure in Experiment 2 allowed the experience of having a sixth finger to 
be extended over a prolonged period of time. This is important in showing that the 
illusion of having an extra finger is not a result of a momentary confusion that is quickly 
resolved by the perceptual system, but can be a stable and ongoing experience.  This 
seems to point that the localisation of touch is not being modelled by high-level inputs 
and are rather processed at a low-level.  It also indicates that our perceptual system 
seems to be prepared to embody additional body parts, even though there is not a 
mental representation for a sixth finger in participants with five-fingered hands. It may 
be that as long as we have sensorial information about a limb positioned in accordance 
with the stereotypical limb position, we are able to embody it. Further research is 
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necessary to identify whether a touch can be misattributed to non-body parts with 
varied shapes or if they need to resemble the human body configuration.     
A continuous sixth finger illusion also opens the possibility of using this illusion 
to explore the plasticity of mental body representations in a variety of ways. Having a 
tactile illusion of a supernumerary finger that can be extended for potentially arbitrary 
durations is a practical and simple method to serve as a base condition to investigate 
somatosensory perception using illusion enhancement or disruption paradigms.  
The illusion of embodying a virtual sixth finger was also studied, by brushing a 
real finger at the same time as the virtual sixth digit, positioned previous to the little 
finger (Hoyet et al., 2016), however the illusion relies on a confusion between the ring 
finger and the virtual sixth finger rather than an additional finger, requiring that the 
fingers proximal to the additional finger are not touched before the sixth finger. In 
contrast, with the six-finger illusion here described, a full six-fingered hand can receive 
tactile feedback and the stimulus to the sixth finger can be manipulated without 
disruption. This new technique can be reproduced in VR, expanding the research 
possibilities of non-body parts with elicited illusory tactile sensations remaining for a 




Six finger illusion 
 22 
References 
 Azañón, E., & Longo, M. R. (2019). Tactile perception: Beyond the somatotopy of the 
somatosensory cortex. Current Biology, 29(9), R322–R324. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2019.03.037 
Baayen, R. H., Davidson, D. J., & Bates, D. M. (2008). Mixed-effects modeling with crossed 
random effects for subjects and items. Journal of Memory and Language, 59(4), 390–
412. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jml.2007.12.005 
Badde, S., Röder, B., & Heed, T. (2019). Feeling a touch to the hand on the foot. Current 
Biology, 29(9), 1491-1497.e4. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2019.02.060 
Banakou, D., Groten, R., & Slater, M. (2013). Illusory ownership of a virtual child body 
causes overestimation of object sizes and implicit attitude changes. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences, 110(31), 12846–12851. 
https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1306779110 
Barr, D. J., Levy, R., Scheepers, C., & Tily, H. J. (2013). Random effects structure for 
confirmatory hypothesis testing: Keep it maximal. Journal of Memory and Language, 
68(3), 255–278. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jml.2012.11.001 
Bates, D., Mächler, M., Bolker, B., & Walker, S. (2015). Fitting linear mixed-effects models 
using lme4. Journal of Statistical Software, 67(1). 
https://doi.org/10.18637/jss.v067.i01 
Bono, D., & Haggard, P. (2019). Where is my mouth? Rapid experience‐dependent plasticity 
of perceived mouth position in humans. European Journal of Neuroscience, 50(11), 
3814–3830. https://doi.org/10.1111/ejn.14508 
Botvinick, M., & Cohen, J. (1998). Rubber hands ‘feel’ touch that eyes see. Nature, 
391(6669), 756. https://doi.org/10.1038/35784 
Six finger illusion 
 23 
Braun, C., Ladda, J., Burkhardt, M., Wiech, K., Preissl, H., & Roberts, L. E. (2005). 
Objective measurement of tactile mislocalization. IEEE Transactions on Biomedical 
Engineering, 52(4), 728–735. https://doi.org/10.1109/TBME.2005.845147 
Cardini, F., & Longo, M. R. (2016). Congruency of body-related information induces 
somatosensory reorganization. Neuropsychologia, 84, 213–221. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2016.02.013 
Carlisle, A. (1814). An account of a family having hands and feet with supernumerary fingers 
and toes. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, 104, 94–101. 
Crea, S., D’Alonzo, M., Vitiello, N., & Cipriani, C. (2015). The rubber foot illusion. Journal 
of NeuroEngineering and Rehabilitation, 12(1), 77. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12984-
015-0069-6 
D’Angelo, M., di Pellegrino, G., & Frassinetti, F. (2017). Invisible body illusion modulates 
interpersonal space. Scientific Reports, 7(1), 1302. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-
017-01441-9 
D’Angelo, M., Maister, L., Tucciarelli, R., Frassinetti, F., & Longo, M. R. (in press). 
Embodying an invisible face shrinks the cone of gaze. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General. 
de Vignemont, F. (2018). Mind the body: An exploration of bodily self-awareness. Oxford 
University Press. 
Ehrsson, H. H. (2009). How many arms make a pair? Perceptual illusion of having an 
additional limb. Perception, 38(2), 310–312. https://doi.org/10.1068/p6304 
Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Lang, A.-G., & Buchner, A. (2007). G*Power 3: A flexible statistical 
power analysis program for the social, behavioral, and biomedical sciences. Behavior 
Research Methods, 39(2), 175–191. https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03193146 
Six finger illusion 
 24 
Gandevia, S. C., & Phegan, C. M. L. (1999). Perceptual distortions of the human body image 
produced by local anaesthesia, pain and cutaneous stimulation. The Journal of 
Physiology, 514(2), 609–616. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-7793.1999.609ae.x 
Guterstam, A., Gentile, G., & Ehrsson, H. H. (2013). The invisible hand illusion: 
Multisensory integration leads to the embodiment of a discrete volume of empty 
space. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 25(7), 1078–1099. 
https://doi.org/10.1162/jocn_a_00393 
Halligan, P. W., Marshall, J. C., & Wade, D. T. (1993). Three arms: A case study of 
supernumerary phantom limb after right hemisphere stroke. Journal of Neurology, 
Neurosurgery & Psychiatry, 56(2), 159–166. https://doi.org/10.1136/jnnp.56.2.159 
Hari, R., Hänninen, R., Mäkinen, T., Jousmäki, V., Forss, N., Seppä, M., & Salonen, O. 
(1998). Three hands: Fragmentation of human bodily awareness. Neuroscience 
Letters, 240(3), 131–134. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3940(97)00945-2 
Holmes, N. P., Crozier, G., & Spence, C. (2004). When mirrors lie: ‘Visual capture’ of arm 
position impairs reaching performance. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral 
Neuroscience, 4(2), 193–200. https://doi.org/10.3758/CABN.4.2.193 
Hoyet, L., Argelaguet, F., Nicole, C., & Lécuyer, A. (2016). “Wow! I have six fingers!”: 
Would you accept structural changes of your hand in VR? Frontiers in Robotics and 
AI, 3, 27. https://doi.org/10.3389/frobt.2016.00027 
Kilteni, K., Normand, J.-M., Sanchez-Vives, M. V., & Slater, M. (2012). Extending body 
space in immersive virtual reality: A very long arm illusion. PLoS ONE, 7(7), e40867. 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0040867 
Lackner, J. R. (1988). Some proprioceptive influences on the perceptual representation of 
body shape and orientation. Brain, 111(2), 281–297. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/brain/111.2.281 
Six finger illusion 
 25 
Lenggenhager, B., Hilti, L., & Brugger, P. (2015). Disturbed body integrity and the “rubber 
foot illusion”. Neuropsychology, 29(2), 205–211. https://doi.org/10.1037/neu0000143 
Lenggenhager, B., Tadi, T., & Blanke, O. (2007). Video ergo sum: Manipulating bodily self-
consciousness. Science, 317(5841), 1096–1099. 
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1143439 
Liu, Y., & Medina, J. (2018). Integrating multisensory information across external and 
motor-based frames of reference. Cognition, 173, 75–86. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2018.01.005 
Longo, M. R., Azañón, E., & Haggard, P. (2010). More than skin deep: Body representation 
beyond primary somatosensory cortex. Neuropsychologia, 48(3), 655–668. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.08.022 
Longo, M. R., & Haggard, P. (2012). What is it like to have a body? Current Directions in 
Psychological Science, 21(2), 140–145. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721411434982 
Longo, M. R., Musil, J. J., & Haggard, P. (2012). Visuo-tactile integration in personal space. 
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 24(3), 543–552. 
https://doi.org/10.1162/jocn_a_00158 
Longo, M. R., Schüür, F., Kammers, M. P. M., Tsakiris, M., & Haggard, P. (2008). What is 
embodiment? A psychometric approach. Cognition, 107(3), 978–998. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2007.12.004 
Maister, L., Sebanz, N., Knoblich, G., & Tsakiris, M. (2013). Experiencing ownership over a 
dark-skinned body reduces implicit racial bias. Cognition, 128(2), 170–178. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2013.04.002 
Mancini, F., Longo, M. R., Iannetti, G. D., & Haggard, P. (2011). A supramodal 
representation of the body surface. Neuropsychologia, 49(5), 1194–1201. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.12.040 
Six finger illusion 
 26 
Manser-Smith, K., Tamè, L., & Longo, M. R. (2018). Tactile confusions of the fingers and 
toes. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 
44(11), 1727–1738. https://doi.org/10.1037/xhp0000566 
McCarroll, H. R. (2000). Congenital anomalies: A 25-year overview. The Journal of Hand 
Surgery, 25(6), 1007–1037. https://doi.org/10.1053/jhsu.2000.6457 
McGonigle, D. J., Hänninen, R., Salenius, S., Hari, R., Frackowiak, R. S. J., & Frith, C. D. 
(2002). Whose arm is it anyway? An fMRI case study of supernumerary phantom 
limb. Brain, 125(6), 1265–1274. https://doi.org/10.1093/brain/awf139 
Mehring, C., Akselrod, M., Bashford, L., Mace, M., Choi, H., Blüher, M., Buschhoff, A.-S., 
Pistohl, T., Salomon, R., Cheah, A., Blanke, O., Serino, A., & Burdet, E. (2019). 
Augmented manipulation ability in humans with six-fingered hands. Nature 
Communications, 10(1), 2401. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-019-10306-w 
Newport, R., Pearce, R., & Preston, C. (2010). Fake hands in action: Embodiment and control 
of supernumerary limbs. Experimental Brain Research, 204(3), 385–395. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00221-009-2104-y 
Newport, R., Wong, D. Y., Howard, E. M., & Silver, E. (2016). The Anne Boleyn illusion is 
a six-fingered salute to sensory remapping. I-Perception, 7(5). 
https://doi.org/10.1177/2041669516669732 
Normand, J.-M., Giannopoulos, E., Spanlang, B., & Slater, M. (2011). Multisensory 
stimulation can induce an illusion of larger belly size in immersive virtual reality. 
PLoS ONE, 6(1), e16128. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0016128 
Oldfield, R. C. (1971). The assessment and analysis of handedness: The Edinburgh inventory. 
Neuropsychologia, 9(1), 97–113. https://doi.org/10.1016/0028-3932(71)90067-4 
Six finger illusion 
 27 
Peck, T. C., Seinfeld, S., Aglioti, S. M., & Slater, M. (2013). Putting yourself in the skin of a 
black avatar reduces implicit racial bias. Consciousness and Cognition, 22(3), 779–
787. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2013.04.016 
Petkova, V. I., & Ehrsson, H. H. (2008). If I were you: Perceptual illusion of body swapping. 
PLoS ONE, 3(12), e3832. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0003832 
Piryankova, I. V., Wong, H. Y., Linkenauger, S. A., Stinson, C., Longo, M. R., Bülthoff, H. 
H., & Mohler, B. J. (2014). Owning an overweight or underweight body: 
Distinguishing the physical, experienced and virtual body. PLoS ONE, 9(8), e103428. 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0103428 
Preston, C., & Ehrsson, H. H. (2016). Illusory obesity triggers body dissatisfaction responses 
in the insula and anterior cingulate cortex. Cerebral Cortex, 26(12), 4450–4460. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhw313 
Ramachandran, V. S., & Rogers-Ramachandran, D. (1996). Synaesthesia in phantom limbs 
induced with mirrors. Proceedings of the Royal Society B, 377–386. 
Richieri-Costa, A., de Miranda, E., Kamiya, T. Y., & Freire-Maia, D. V. (1990). Autosomal 
dominant tibial hemimelia-polysyndactyly-triphalangeal thumbs syndrome: Report of 
a Brazilian family. American Journal of Medical Genetics, 36(1), 1–6. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/ajmg.1320360102 
Romano, D., Bottini, G., & Maravita, A. (2013). Perceptual effects of the mirror box training 
in normal subjects. Restorative Neurology and Neuroscience, 31(4), 373–386. 
https://doi.org/10.3233/RNN-120273 
Sadibolova, R., & Longo, M. R. (2014). Seeing the body produces limb-specific modulation 
of skin temperature. Biology Letters, 10(4), 20140157. 
https://doi.org/10.1098/rsbl.2014.0157 
Six finger illusion 
 28 
Schweizer, R., Maier, M., Braun, C., & Birbaumer, N. (2000). Distribution of 
mislocalizations of tactile stimuli on the fingers of the human hand. Somatosensory & 
Motor Research, 17(4), 309–316. https://doi.org/10.1080/08990220020002006 
Senna, I., Maravita, A., Bolognini, N., & Parise, C. V. (2014). The marble-hand illusion. 
PLOS ONE, 9(3), e91688. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0091688 
Sforza, A., Bufalari, I., Haggard, P., & Aglioti, S. M. (2010). My face in yours: Visuo-tactile 
facial stimulation influences sense of identity. Social Neuroscience, 5(2), 148–162. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17470910903205503 
Slater, M. (2009). Inducing illusory ownership of a virtual body. Frontiers in Neuroscience, 
3(2), 214–220. https://doi.org/10.3389/neuro.01.029.2009 
Steptoe, W., Steed, A., & Slater, M. (2013). Human tails: Ownership and control of extended 
humanoid avatars. IEEE Transactions on Visualization and Computer Graphics, 
19(4), 583–590. https://doi.org/10.1109/TVCG.2013.32 
Tajadura-Jiménez, A., Longo, M. R., Coleman, R., & Tsakiris, M. (2012). The person in the 
mirror: Using the enfacement illusion to investigate the experiential structure of self-
identification. Consciousness and Cognition, 21(4), 1725–1738. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2012.10.004 
Tamè, L., Bumpus, N., Linkenauger, S. A., & Longo, M. R. (2017). Distorted body 
representations are robust to differences in experimental instructions. Attention, 
Perception, & Psychophysics, 79(4), 1204–1216. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13414-017-
1301-1 
Tamè, L., Linkenauger, S. A., & Longo, M. R. (2018). Dissociation of feeling and belief in 
the rubber hand illusion. PLOS ONE, 13(10), e0206367. 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0206367 
Six finger illusion 
 29 
Treisman, A. (1996). The binding problem. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 6(2), 171–178. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0959-4388(96)80070-5 
Tsakiris, M. (2008). Looking for myself: Current multisensory input alters self-face 
recognition. PLoS ONE, 3(12), e4040. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0004040 
Won, A. S., Bailenson, J., Lee, J., & Lanier, J. (2015). Homuncular flexibility in virtual 
reality. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 20(3), 241–259. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/jcc4.12107 
 
 
